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JUDICIAL LOGIC AS APPLIED IN DELIMITING
THE CONCEPT OF BUSINESS "AFFECTED
WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST"
In a recent case1 the Supreme Court of the United States
declared invalid a Tennessee statute declaring the selling of
gasoline to be a business "affected with a public interest" and
fixing the prices at which that commodity could be sold. Said
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland: "In support of the act . -. . it is urged that gasoline is of widespread
use; that enormous quantities of it are sold in the state of Tennessee; that it has become necessary and indispensable in carrying on commercial activities within the state. But we are here
concerned with the character2 of the business, not with its size,
or the extent to which the commodity is used. Gasoline is one
of the ordinary commodities of trade, differing
. .
in no
essential respect from a variety of other articles. The decisions
referred to above 3 make it perfectly clear that the business of
dealing in such articles, irrespective of its extent, does not come
within the phrase 'affected with a public interest.' " And so
again the Supreme Court has denied the right of the legislative
branch of government to invade the domain of businesses which
it calls "essentially private" in nature.
Any business man, entrepreneur, social reformer, or in
fact any one directly or indirectly concerned in the relation of
business and government might well ask what is the basis for
this governmental control, or lack of it, and what do the courts
mean when they say that a particular business is or is not
"affected with a public interest?" Why is it that the business of
storing grain is affected with such an interest 4 while the business
of preparing food 5 is not?; that companies engaged in the sale to
1

Wiliams v. Standard Oil Co., (1929)

278 U. S. 235.

2Italics, the writer's.

' The Court cited as controlling Tyson v. Banton, (1927) 273 U. S.
418; Ribnik v. McBride, (1928) 277 U. S. 350; as well as the familiar
case of Munn v. Illinois, (1876) 94 U. S. 113.
4
Munn v. Illinois, (1876) 94 U. S. 113.
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, (1922) 262 U.
S. 522, 67 L. Ed. 756, 27 A. L. R. 1280.
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the public of gas,8 water,7 and electricity8 are placed in the "public" category while the corner grocery, 9 the doctor,1 0 and the
druggist"' are left to be classified as "private."
And so the
questioner could go through the entire list of modern businesses
which, from a practical standpoint, more or less affect the public
welfare. The lawyer finds himself hard put to offer any real
reason for these distinctions, and can only explain them in the
te-rins which the courts have themselves used. He can only be
certain of one thing, and that is that all business is juristically
divided into two categories, one "public" and the other "private," and that the courts have placed some enterprises in the
one class and some in the other. He also knows that the
Supreme Court has said, with great emphasis, that a "private"
business cannot be made a "public" one for the purposes of
regulation by legislative fiat. 32 But when he starts to reason
"why," his troubles begin. 13 The impossibility of generalizing
about characteristics of enterprises "affected with a publi interest" is apparent to anyone who has investigated the subject
with thoroughness.' 4 The cases simply won't fit into any welldefined rules, try as the courts do to formulate them,15 and anyone who attempts a logical exposition of the law must either
bend the cases to fit his own pre-conceived pattern, or else give
the task up as a hopeless job.',' Without any disrespect to text'Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas Co., 132 Ind. 575, 28 N. E. 853

(1892).

'Spring Valley Waterworks v. SchottZer, (1884) 110 U. S. 347, 28
I.. Ed. 173.

sBneUl v. Clinton Elec. Co., (1902) 196 Ill. 626.
'Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra.
"H6urley v. Huddingfield, 156 Ind. 416.
"Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 49 Sup. Ct. 57 (1928).

"Commission v. Duke, (1925) 266 U. S. 570.
"See for excellent treatment of the "public interest" doctrine in
general, Robinson, 'The Public Utility Concept in American Law,"
(1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 277; Rottschaeffer, "The Field of Governmental
Price Control," (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 438; Keezer, "Some Questions Involved in the Application of the 'Public Interest' Doctrine," (1927) 25
Mich. L. Rev. 596.
"4In Mr. Keezer's article, supra, a whole section is headed "Impossibility of Generalizing About Public Interest Enterprises."
19See opinion of Chief Justice Taft in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of
Industrial Relations, supra, where he lays down three general rules,
which are taken up infra.
1'Professor Bruce Wyman, in his two volume treatise on Public
Service Corporations (1911) attempted to generalize, and largely for
this reason his monumental work cannot be looked upon as authoritative In this respect.
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book writers on Public Service Law, it seems apparent that a
treatise which attempts to define a "public utility" or what elements go to constitute a "public interest" must be, in effect, a
mere recital of decided cases- an approach similar to that of
Justice McKenna' 7 when he said, in holding the business of fire
insurance to be "affected with a public interest" that "we can
best illustrate by examples."
However, conceding the difficulty of formulating any precise rules of law in respect to the "public interest" doctrine,
it might be worthwhile to examine the logical processes of the
courts in "delimiting" the concept, with some hope of at least
learning the judicial methods of approach. This can only be
accomplished by resorting to the reasoning in the opinions of the
courts themselves, and, by their language, discovering what
logical methods, if any, they have used in developing a concept
which has, under our constitutional form of government, taken
on an enormous importance. That there are many who contend,
with much force, that it is futile to attempt to analyze the
methods of courts by what they themselves say cannot be denied. Such scholars admonish us to look at what the courts
actually do for a true criterion, and to tear aside that veil of
language known as the opinion, which is regarded as a mere
rationalization used to cover up the true basis of a decision. It
is doubtless true that personal, political, and economic influences,
unexpressed as they necessarily must be, are a force in determining a great many judicial decisions. This applies particularly to
the field of constitutional law, where policy is so closely bound
up with legal doctrine.18 But, conceding the force of this very
obvious truth, it is nevertheless true that the opinions of the
courts, written as they are to express the views of the judges,
T
German A7liance Insurance Company v. Lewis, (1914) 233 U. S.
389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612, 58 L. Ed. 1011. This case is dealt with in detail

infra.

" See "Personal, Political, and EconomicInfluences in the Decisions
of Judges," by G. C. Haines (1922) 17 Ill. L. Rev. 116. Ehrlich, in his
"The Sbience of Legal Method," p. 48. says in part:: "The administration of justice has always contained a personal element. In all ages
social, political, and cultural movements have necessarily exerted an
influence upon it; but whether any individual jurist yields more or
less to such influences, whether he is more inclined to follow tradition
or is rather disposed to introduce changes and innovations depends,
of course, less on any theory of legal method than on his own personal

temperament."
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still constitute the chief evidence of reflective thinking, and
must be the basis for any study of the application of logical
methods of judicial thought. And it is this judicial logic which
we propose to analyze.
And what is the starting point for such an analysis? What
seem to be the chief methods of attack? Through an examination of the cases it semes apparent that the courts have adopted,
in more or less restricted form, two philosophical or logical
methods of approach. For lack of better descriptive terms we
can call one the "functional analogy" method and the other the
"physical analogy" method. As in the case of any attempt to
give a title to something so vague as a philosophical method,
there is much lacking in our choice of terms. But they can serve
our purpose as well as any we can think of.
Under our American system of government, the doctrine of
business being "affected with a public interest" is used as a
criterion for sustaining public regulation. Because of the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Federal Constitution the state and federal governments cannot
regulate in detail a business unless it is "affected with a public
interest.1'9 But this principle is not applicable to all governmental regulation. For instance, under the so-called "police
power" states have been permitted to regulate to a certain extent businesses and professions admitted to be essentially
"private" in nature. Typical instances are regulations of physicians 20 and employment agencies 21 through the requirement of
a license, regulation of working hours in industry,2 2 and workmen's compensation acts. 23 One wonders just where the line
can be drawn, or whether it can be drawn at all.24 Since our
study is concerned only with the "public interest" doctrine, we
are not concerned with the regulation of private business. In
fact, as far as regulation itself goes there have been attempts to
break up business "affected with a public interest" itself into
" Tyson v. Banton, supra; Ribni v. McBride, supra.
3Dent v. W. Va., (1889) 129 U. S. 114.
2Brazee v. Michigan, (1917) 241 U. S. 340.
"Arizona Emp. Liability Case, 250 U. S. 400.
"Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412.
21A good exposition of this control of "private" business is found
in Bevis, "Administrative Commissions and Administration of Justice,"
(1928) 2 Univ. of Cin. L. Rev. 1, 6 et seq; Clark, Social Control of
Business (1926).
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two classes--business only slightly "affected" such as insurance, 25 which justifies sume regulation, and business thoroughly
saturated with "public interest" and justifying detailed regulation, such as companies furnishing gas, electricity, and water.
These latter are known as "public utilities." 26 This distinction
is more artificial than real, and adds a useless refinement to an
already over-refined phase of the law. For the purposes of this
analysis it is doubly useless, for we are not concerned with results of the "public interest" concept as with the logical methods
used by the courts in its application.
The "public interest" doctrine is old,2 7 and in different
periods it has been used for different purposes. 28 Just as today
it has its most important application in cases of public regulation, especially price-fixing, 29 so in its early history it was used
to fix the application of special liabilities to business.3 0 But the
principle has remained the same in that it has always been invoked to force business to assume a greater responsibility toward
the public, whether in the matter of liability, discrimination, or
prices. So the methods of logical approach in the development
of the "public interest" concept should be considered with this
principle in mind.
By the "function method" of approach we mean that process of judicial logic which gives practically conclusive weight
to the particular function of the business in society in determining whether or not it is "affected with a public interest." By
such a process the enterprise is considered on its merits, and the
courts are forced to take into account its status with reference
to the economic and social welfare of the public. This includes
such questions as whether the business possesses a legal or
virtual monopoly, i. e., whether an appreciable section of the
public "are placed at such a disadvantage in the bargaining
struggle that a legislature might reasonably anticipate serious
'
consequences to the community as a whole; "30
whether the con1 German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, supra, note 17.

"For an elaboration of this distinction see Robinson, "The Public
Utility as Social Engineering," (1929) 14 Corn. L. Q. 1.
NAdler, Business Jurisprudence, (1915) 28 H. L. R. 135.
Burdick, Origin of Duties of Public Service Corporations, (1911)
11 Col. L. Rev. 515, 616, 743.
" The Field of Governmental Price Control, supra, note 13.

30Stone, J., dissenting in Ribnik v. McBride, Supra.
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modity furnished by the business is a prime necessity to the
general public; and whether such classification is justified on
the grounds of "public necessity," which in effect embraces the
two prior considerations. In other words, the "functional" approach is from the social-economic standpoint, in that the policy
behind the application of the "public interest" doctrine is conditioned primarily upon such consideration. We might go so
far as to say, with Professor Robinson, that the matter becomes
a question of "pure economic fact.''31 In effect, the courts view
the question as one in which the social or economic utility of the
particular business is the criterion.
As opposed to this so-called "functional" method there is
that which we have called the "physical analogy" approach. It
presupposes, upon largely historical grounds, that some businesses are inherently "affected with a public interest." With
this proposition as an a priori assumption the courts condition
the application of the "public interest" doctrine to any particular business upon the basis of the physical analogy between
such a business and those of the group already placed in the
"public" category. 3 2 Such a method has little or no regard for
social or economic aspects of business, but embraces an approach
based upon mere logical exposition of judicial phraseology.
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to set forth the part
which these two essentially different philosophical methods of
approach have played in developing and delimiting the "public
interest" concept. It cannot be assumed that the particular
methods are in all cases well defined, for, as in the case of any
juristic philosophy in action, the distinctions are at times vague
rnd ill-defined, and in many instances confused. However, it is
believed that an examination of the cases will show that there is
a very practical basis for the analysis which has been postulated.
II.
Since the "physical analogy" method is predominantly
historical, we must consider what we might term the origin of
"Robinson, "Public Utility as Social Engineering," supra.
n See a note in 15 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (1901).
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"public service" law and of the "public interest" doctrine.83
The idea of business "affected with a public interest"
apparently had its origin in the old common law idea of the
"common" callings. In a very scholarly analysis of the early
English cases it has been pointed out3 4 that the term "common,"
which is more or less synonymous with "public," was originally
applied to all businesses which held out to serve the public generally, as opposed to those in which it was the purpose to serve
merely private individuals or groups. Thus, in the Year Books
we find the term "common"
applied to farriers, bakers,
surgeons, and tailors as well as to the familiar carriers and innkeepers. 35 Such businesses had fastened upon them the duty to
sell at reasonable prices, to serve all who applied, and to sell
true commodities as represented.3 6
Professor Wyman has maintained, in justifying his fundamental theory of the nature of business "affected with a public
interest," that the basis for denoting these medieval businesses
as "common" was the presence of a monopoly, legal or virtual.8T
But this has been refuted 8 and the true basis shown to be the
holding out as "open to public service" 3 9 i. e., the profession to
serve all indiscriminately.
It is true that the particular period of which we now speak
was one of governmental paternalism and regulation. 40 Price
control was the order of the day and no enterprise was free.
However, it does not follow that this general governmental regulation of practically everything was connected with the judicial
concept of "common."
The application of the term "common"
' The division of business into two classes, one private in the

sense that it is free from extra responsibility and governmental regulation, and the other public in the sense that It Is not free, seems
peculiar to Anglo-American law. Adler, "Business Jurisprudence,"
supra, Note 27; Preface, Story on Bailments (1856).
"Adler, "Business Jurisprudence." supra, Note 27.
"Op. cit., pp. 149-152, and cases there cited.
"Sheppard, writing in 1652 (Office of Justice of the Peace).
"Wyman, Public Service Corporations, Chap. I-VII; "Public Callings and the Trust Problem," (1904) 17 Harv. L. Rev. 226.
"Adler, "Business Jurisprudence," supra; Burdick, "Origin of
Duties of Public Service Corporations," supra, Note 28.
""What, then, did 'common' mean? Simply 'buslness'---buslness'
carrier, 'business' tailor, 'business' barber." Adler, supra, p. 152.
"'The Field of Government Price Control, supra, Note 13; Freund.
Police Power (1924), p. 382; Cheadle, "Governmental Control of Business," 20 Col. L. Rev. 438, 550 (1920); Gilmore, Regulation of Prices,
17 Green Bag 627 (1925).
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in this period carried with it added responsibility of the business to the public, just as the application of the doctrine of
"public interest" does today, with the difference being only one
of emphasis as to the particular duties. 41
Since holding out to serve the public generally placed a
business in the "common" category, how, then, did the law get
away from this old common law concept? It is certainly not in
42
vogue judicially today, nor has it been for some time past.
With the dawn of what we might call our modern judicial era,
or at least semi-modern, we find that only two members of the
erstwhile "common" group retain their status, namely, carriers and innkeepers. No definite time can be said to mark the
passage of the older concept, for like all legal progress, it was
a matter of slow evolution. 43 Just why carriers and innkeepers
who held themselves out to serve generally remained "common,"
and other businesses such as those of tailor, surgeon, and farrier
dropped away and became essentially "private" is somewhat a
matter of conjecture. Generally speaking, we might say that
the laissez faire doctrine which was responsible for this change
in attitude was due to the individualistic ideas disseminated by
the classical economists, culminating in the assumption that
4
social welfare was a by-product of economic individualism. '
The fact that carriers and innkeepers were excepted from this
sweep is explained as having been due to a variety of reasons.4
It was said that in the cases of the carrier's trade there were
peculiar internal characteristics which brought it constantly before the courts. Their liability for refusal to serve had become a familiar doctrine long after the reasons for its imposiBurdick, supra, Note 28.
4 Justice Holmes, In his Common Law, p. 184, says: after quoting
from Lane v. Cotton, to the effect that "if a man takes upon himself
a public employment he Is bound to serve as far as the employment
extends:" "An attempt to apply this doctrine generally at the present
day would be thought monstrous. But it formed a part of a consistent
scheme for holding those who followed useful callings up to the mark.

The scheme has given way to more liberal notions but the
disjecta membra still move."
" Three cases, decided In the early eighteenth century, still bear
out the medieval idea: Gisborn v. Hurst, 1 Salk. 249 (1710); Lane v.
Cotton, 12 Mod. 472 (1701); Coggs v. Bernard, 1 Ld. Raym. 909 (1714).
" The Field of Governmental Price Control, supra; see generally
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, and Ricardo, Principles of Economy

and Taxation.

"Adler, supra, Note 27; Burdlck, supra, Note 28.
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tion were forgotten. The same was true of the innkeeper.
Another factor suggested is the analogy of these two businesses
to public offices on account of their importance.4 6 Undoubtedly
the indefinable but ever recurring principle of public policy
played no little part, for the liabilities attached by the "commonness" of these two groups was advantageous to the evergrowing numbers of merchants and travellers, who had become
4
tha darlings of the courts. 7
After this period of transition we find that, so long as there
was a holding out to serve the public generally, carriers and innkeepers had come to be looked upon as inherently "common,"
and the term "common" had become more or less synonymous
with the phrase "affected with a public interest."
This inherentness was merely a matter of history, but it seems that the
courts had lost sight of it.
From the very nature of the business of the innkeeper, it
is apparent that the extension of the "public interest" concept
through analogy cannot be very broad. The business of innkeeping today differs only in the matter of degree from the same
business three hundred years ago, and its ramifications and
variations are slight.
The modern hotel business has been held to be "affected
with a public interest." 48 Although Wyman maintains 49 that
the basis for regulation and imposition of special liability upon
hotels rests upon the existence of a time monopoly, i. e. that the
prospective patron will pay exhorbitant prices rather than look
elsewhere for accommodations, and is therefore the result of
what we have called the "functional" approach, there is no
authority in the cases to show that the courts have adopted this
view. Thus, in the case of State v. Norval Hotel Co.,50 where
the right of the state to regulate hotel rates was in question the
JJeremy on Carriers, p. 59.
Adler, supra, Note 27; Burick, supra, Note 28; Also see Bonner
v. Welbourne, 7 Ga. 296 (1849), where it is said: "It is because the inns
and innkeepers have to do with the travelling public--strangers-and
that for brief periods, and under circumstances which render it Impossible for each customer to contract for the terms of his entertainment, that the law has taken them so strictly in charge." Also see
Harrellv. Owens, 1 Dev. & Vat. 273 (1835).
"Nelson v. Johnson, (1908) 104 Minn. 440, 116 N. W. 828; State
v. Norval Hotel Co., 133 N. E. (Ohio) 75.
OPublic Service Corporations, Vol. I, Sec. 106.
" 133 N. E. (Ohio) 75.
4T
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court referred to the fact that the business of innkeeping was
perhaps the oldest of the "common callings," and there rested
its decision, holding that the modern hotel was "affected with a
public interest." In other words, the modern hotel physically
resembles the old inn as a business, and since the old inn was
"affected with a public interest" the hotel is likewise
"affected."
A simple rationale.
Boarding houses have been held not to come within the concept because there is no holding out to serve generally. This is
apparently the quality which distinguishes them from inns. 5'
Except in the ease of Civil Rights Statutes, which do not rest
upon the "public interest" doctrine,5 2 there has been no detailed regulation of restaurants attempted under the "public
interest" doctrine, but the question has arisen as to the duty of
a restaurant to serve all who apply. Thus postulated, it has
been held that it does not come within the concept because it
does izot furnish lodging.53 Nowhere do we find the courts passing upon the question of whether the purveyance of food to the
public is equally, if not more important than furnishing lodging
from an economic or social standpoint. And surely the modern
restaurant possesses just as much of a time monopoly as does the
modern hotel. But the courts seem too busy drawing physical
analogies between restaurants and inns to bother with "functional" considerations.5 4
As we have pointed out, the extension by physical analogy
of the "public interest" doctrine in respect to inns has been narrow. But exactly the converse is true in the matter of carriers,
for, with the essentially broad term of carriage in itself, together
with judicial subtlety, the analogical extension of the doctrine as
so applied constituted the chief vehicle of advance for a long
period of time. In fact, one eminent authority 55 has said that
the concept of common carrier or perhaps more accurately that
of "transportation," has been the chief reliance of the courts,
"Macfntosh v. Rchops, 92 Ore. 307, 180 Pac. 593 (1919); McOlauglzerty v. Cline, 128 Tenn. 605, 163 S. W. 801 (1913).
"See State v. Brown, 112 Kan. 814, 212 Pac. 663.
u Sheffer v. Willoughby, 61 Ill. App. 263 (1895); Merrill v. Hodson,
88 Conn. 314, 91 At. 533 (1914).
"Courts in this country have practically abandoned the judicial
enlargement of the "public interest" category, and now rely on the
legislature to make the first move. Robinson, supra, Note 13.
"Robinson, The Public Utility Concept, supra.
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especially the Supreme Court of the United States, in extending
the "public interest" concept up to the case of the German
Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis. 56 This matter will be commented
later.
Theupon
older forms of common carriage, which
were prevalent
at the beginning of our so-called modern era, and which were ineluded in the older concept have had their "public interest"
taken largely for granted. 57 The actual carriage seems to have
been regarded as inherently "public," the only question being
as to whether there was a holding out to serve all who apply,
which must be raised in any case. 58
With the development of new inventions little difficulty was
found in imposing liability and sustaining regulation of them.
The question was always one of extending the physical analogy
of carriage. The doctrine might be stated that, if there was carriage plus a necessary holding out, the enterprise was looked
upon as being in the "public category. Thus, in the case of
Wilmington Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commissior. of
Cal. 59 the court assumed without argument that a steamship,
holding itself out to serve generally, could be regulated as to
rates.
With the development of railroads the problem was a comparatively simple one. Their analogy to the older common carriers could not be denied.°0 There was no attempt to reason out
the matter by functional analogy except in a few instances, and
in those cases it seems to be pure rationalization, for the "public"
status of railroads was already well established. Chief Justice
Waite, in upholding the right of a state to regulate railroad
rates l observed: "Railroad companies are common carries for
- (1914) 233 U. S. 389. See also for a discussion of this point

Robinson, The Public Utility as Social Engineering, 14 Corn. L. Q. 1
(1929).

OTThis includes wagons, stage coaches, truckmen, teamsters, porters
and ferries. See Fziarson v. Frazier, 142 Ala. 232, 37 So. 825 (1904);
63 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 718 (1915). Por a general discussion see Story on
Bailments, Sec. 496, and cases there cited.
"Commission v. Duke, supra, Note 12.
" (1915)
236 U. S. 151. As to whether a steamship is an innkeeper
see Clark v. Burns, 118 Mass. 275 (1875); Adams v. N. J. Go., 151 N. Y.
163, 45 N. E. 369 (1896). The decisions were negative.
6 See Thurston v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 4 Dillon 321 (1877); Gleana
d 0. U. R. R. Co. v. Yarwood, 15 Ill. 468 (1854).
eC0. B. & Q. R. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155.
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hire. They are incorporated as such and given extraordinary
power, in order that they may better serve the public in that
capacity. They are therefore engaged in a public employment,
affecting the public interest and subject to legislative control by
their charters." From the language used the Chief Justice seems
to be putting the right of control upon the basis of legal
monopoly, although he accords great weight to the words "common carriers for hire." But the courts generally did not bother
with such rationalization, being content to simply classify the
railroads as common carriers and be done with it.62 Even Chief
Justice Waite himself, in his opinion in Munn v. fllinois, 6 3 decided at the same term of court, seems to assume that common
carriers for hire are inherently affected with a public interest,
regardless of charter.
Without generalizing too greatly it seems safe to say that
the entire field of modern carriage has been brought within the
"public interest" fold by physical analogy. Take for another
good example the modern taxicab. From time immemorial the
similar occupation of hackmen who held themselves out to serve
had been held "public" and subject to regulation6 4 and the
American courts have sustained such regulation without question.65 As to just how far this concept has governed the courts
in determining the "public interest" of taxicabs, which are the
modern prototype of hackmen, is not entirely apparent. The
regulation of the former was upheld by the Supreme 'Court of
the United States in a case66 involving the question of whether
the defendant taxicab company came within the operation of the
District of Columbia Public Service Act. In holding that it did
the Court reasoned that since it was a carrier, serving the public
generally it was within the "public interest" concept. "The
important thing is what it does, not what the charter says
," said the Court. The public grant of privileges was
held to be not determinative.
It would be useless to go into all forms of regulation of corn01Keezer, Some Questions in the Application of the "Public Interest" Doctrine, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 596, 599 (1927).
' 94 U. S.113 (1876).
" Wyman, Public Service Corportaions, Sec. 186.
"Bonce v. Dubuque St. By. Co., 53 Iowa 278, 5 N. W. 577 (1880);
Combs v. Lakewood, 68 N. J. Law 582 (1902).
" Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U. S. 252.
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mon carriers as such. The whole theory of federal regulation of
the transportation of passengers and property by rail or waterway, and of oil through pipe lines, is based upon the theory that
the agencies so doing are common carriers. 67 Possibly the latest
example of the carrier concept being extended in this manner
(physical analogy) has been in the case of motor-bus transportation.67*
In the matter of railroads, steamships, taxicabs, pipe lines,
etc., the approach by physical analogy was not so difficult. However, even when confronted with much more difficult problems
the courts continued unabashed. By the end of the nineteenth
century the status of telephone and telegraph companies had
become very important. The courts were faced with the problem
of how to sustain public control of these great enterprises, which
had become practical public necessities. It would seem that the
public status of these businesses could have been worked out by
a "functional" approach, taking into consideration their great
social and economic importance. Such companies in practically
all cases exercised legal monopolies and were the beneficiaries of
public grants and privileges, and the public necessity of the
commodity furnished could hardly be questioned. But we find
only a few courts giving these elements any consideration. 8
The great majority went off on the "physical analogy"
approach. For instance, in Hockett v. State"9 the Indiana court
was faced with the question of whether a regulation of rates of
telephone companies could be sustained. In holding that it
could be the court said: "The telephone is one of the remarkable
productions of the present century . . . It may therefore be
regarded, when relatively considered, as an indispensable element of commerce. The relations which it has assumed toward
the public make it a common carrier of news-a common carrier
in the sense that a telegraph is a common carrier-and impose
upon it some well-defined obligations of a public character. All
UInterstate Commerce Act, c. 104, Sec. 1, 24 Stat. at L. 379. Also
xee the Pipe Line Cases, (1914) 234 U. S. 548, where the Supreme Court
held that if the business of transporting oil through pipe lines was in

fact common carriage, it came within the act, as subject to regulation.
w*Ex parte Tindall, 229 Pac. (Okla. 1924) 125.

" Turnpike Co. v. Anerican New Co., 43 N. J. L. 381 (1881); State

v. Citizens Tel Co., 61 S. C. 83 (1901).
"105 Ind. 250, 5 N. E. 170 (1886).
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the instruments and appliances used by the telephone company
in the prosecution of its business are, consequently, in legal contemplation, devoted to a public use."
Similar reasoning was employed by Justice Brewer, later
a member of the Supreme Court, in the case of Missouri v. Befl
Telephone Co.7 In deciding that the company must serve without discrimination he said: "A telephonic system is simply a
system for the transmission of intelligence or news. It is perhaps in a limited sense and yet in a very strict sense, a common

carrier. It must be equal in its dealing with all.

.

.

.1

The extension by such an analogy in the case of the telegraph and telephone has been severely criticized 72 as a basis for
sustaining regulation, and it is suggested, and we think correctly, that such "public interest" should have been conditioned
upon the fact that such enterprises possess legal monopolies,
coupled with the consideration of the great necessity of the commodity furnished.
It would seem that the courts could have pursued the same
line of attack in the case of companies furnishing gas, water,
and electricity, but apparently they did not. The public interest
doctrine was applied to them largely on the basis of their possession of legal grants of privileges, such as eminent domain,
rights of way, etc. 7 3 Therefore, the approach would seem to be
"functional," since the possession of these legal privileges would
grant a monopoly in a necessity of life.7 4
However, the fact that the carrier analogy dominated the
courts to a comparatively recent date, even in the case of gas,
water, and electric companies is apparent from the dissenting
opinion of Justice Lamar in the German Alliance Insurance Co.
7623 Fed. 539 (1885), aff'd in 127 U. S. 180.
"1Similar reasoning is followed in the cases of Gardner v. Provi.dence Tel. Co., 23 R. I. 262; State v. Del. T. & T. Co., 47 Fed. 633 (1891).
"Note, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (1901).
"Almstead v. Proprietors ot Morris Aqueduct, (1885) 47 N. J. L.
811; See generally Burdick, Origin of Duties of Public Service Corporations, 11 Col. L. Rev. 616, et seq.
"But see the brief of counsel in Jones v. City of Portland, 245
U. S., 217, where it was argued that "If the furnishing of heat generated
by an electric current, or heat produced by the combustion of gas is a
public use, the one transmitted through wires over the highway, the
other conveyed through pipes under the highway, why then is not the
furnishing of heat in the latent form of coal or wood by transportation
along highways equally a public use."
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ease.75 He frowned upon the contention that the business of insurance was affected with a public interest, and strenuously
argued that the "public interest" group all "have direct relation to the business or facilities of transportation or distribution-to the transportation of passengers, goods, or intelligence
by vehicle or wire; to the distribution of water, gas, or electricity
through ditch, pipe, or wire; to wharfage, storage, or accommodation to property before the journey begins, when it ends, or
along the way. When thus enumerated, they appear to be
grouped around the common carrieras the typical 'public busizess.",-Y76 In the same case Justice MeKenna, in writing for the
majority had referred to the carrier group as "obviously" of a
public nature. The case was decided almost forty years after
Munn v. Illinois77 and even then that famous case was referred
to in the dissent as having been based upon physical analogy.
MI.
So far it has been the purpose to show the importance of
what we have called the "physical analogy" method in developing and delimiting the concept of business "affected with a public interest." Starting with Munn v. Illinois78 the functional
approach begins to grow in importance. However, it must not
be supposed that the physical analogy method is thrown overboard, for it still reigns supreme within its limits. However,
the fact becomes increasingly apparent that the courts begin to
rely on social and economic factors in applying the concept outside of the field of pure carriage.
The facts brought to the consideration of the Court in the
Munn case are too well known to necessitate any detailed exposition. The state of Illinois had declared grain elevators to be
"affected with a public interest" and prescribed the maximum
rates which could be charged. The statute was so framed as to be
applicable only to elevators in Chicago. It was shown as a fact
that in the grain elevator business in that city there was a vir- (1914) 233 U. S. 389.
'aOp. cit.
' This is evidently one of the cases which Justice Lamar referred
to when he refers to "wharfage. storage, or accommodation along the
way." It must be admitted that there is some force to this conclusion
when the language in the Munn case Is considered. See infra.
U (1876) 94 U. S. 113.
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tual monopoly exercised over practically all the grain raised in
the Northwest. A divided Court upheld the statute. Chief
Justice Waite, writing for the majority first quoted from Lord
Hale79 to the effect that when a business or property is "affected
with a public interest it ceases to be juris privati only," which
really meant nothing at all. And why were the particular elevators "affected with a public interest?" Because, due to geographical location and the limitation of grain elevator sites in
Chicago, they exercised a practical monopoly of the entire grain
production of the country. To use the words of the Court "they
stand in the very 'gateway of commerce' and take toll from all
who pass. Their business most certainly tends to a common
charge and is become a thing of public interest and use
It presents, therefore, a case for the application of a long-known
and well-established principle in social science, and this statute
simply extends the law so as to meet this new development of
commercial progress."
It has been said s ° that the common carrier analogy still
dominated the Court in this decision. This seems to be true only
in a limited sense, for if we are to take the language of the
opinion at its face value, the emphasis was placed upon the existence of virtual monopoly in a necessity of life, and not upon
the fact that grain elevators were ancillary to common carriers.
The Court here, for practically the first time, begins to talk about
"social science" and "public necessity."
In Budd v. New York s ' the doctrine of the Munn case was
precisely followed in a case which involved substantially the
same factual set-up. But Air. Justice Brewer, in a vigorous dissent, denied the entire Munn doctrine. It will be remembered
that this judge was willing enough to apply the "public interest" doctrine to telephone and telegraph companies upon the
8 2
physical analogy to common carriers.
But within two years the Supreme Court rendered a most
"1 Harg. L. Tracts 78, where Lord Hale was dealing principally
with the question of wharves which had been dedicated to the public,

an entirely different question than that which Chief Justice Waite had
under consideration.

*Robinson, The Public Utility Concept, supra, Note 13, at p. 280.
81(1892) 143 U. S. 517, 36 L. Ed. 247.
82

See p. 28 herein.
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confusing decision8 3 which upset the nice principles laid down
in the Munn and Budd cases. The Court had before it a North
Dakota statute regulating grain elevators all over the state,
without regard to size or location. The defendant, an elevator
operator, succeeded in showing without contradiction that there
was no monopoly element whatsoever. The court was left without any functional approach, or the basis therefor, and completely reverted to the physical analogy theory. In the opinion
it was said that the "facts rehearsed (the matter of monopoly)
are for those who make, not those who interpret the law.
*When it is once admitted that it is competent for the legislature
to control the business of elevating and storing grain . . . in
cities of one size and in some circumstances, it follows that such
power may, be legally exerted over the same business when carried on in smaller cities and in other circumstances."
Four
Justices dissented upon the ground that the facts did not bring
the ease within the rule of the Budd and Munn cases, and if one
accepts the functional approach there can be no doubt that such
a contention is valid. But the Court evidently wanted to sustain
the regulation, and was driven to the physical analogy method
of reasoning to do it, namely, that in the iMunn case it was held
that grain elevators were "public," and in the Brass case the
subject involved was grain elevators, which had thus become
"public" because of the Munn case. The only fact to be proved
was the physical nature of the business, according to the Court.
Somewhat analogous is the line of attack followed in applying the "public interest" doctrine to stockyards. In Rateliffe
v. Wichita Union Stockyard Co.s the validity of a Kansas statute regulating stockyard rates was before the court. In upholding the application of the doctrine it was observed that "the
operation of a stockyard has more of the characteristics of a public business than the carrying on of an elevator or a warehouse.
It possesses the market features including considerations of sanitation and health, and also has the monopolistic features. The
stockyards in question are in a commercial center, and constitute the public live stock market for a great region. . . The
company has therefore a practical monopoly of a vast busi'Brass v. North Dakota, (1894) 153 U. S. 391, 38 L. Ed. 757.
(1906) 74 Kan. 1, 86 Pac. 150.
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ness.''8 s There can be no doubt that what was uppermost in
the mind of the court were important economic considerations,
and that it relied exclusively upon the functional method.
But Chief Justice Taft, in deciding the constitutional question as to whether the rates of stockyards could be regulated
under the Packers and Stockyards Act, did not see fit to go into
such questions, and the ease with which he declared stockyards
to be "affected with a public interest" makes one wonder at his
subsequent opinion in the Wolff Packing Co. case.85 * Said the
Chief Justice: "The act therefore treats the various stockyards
of the country as great national public utilities to promote the
flow of commerce from the ranges and farms in the middle west
to the consumers in the east. It assumes that they conduct
a business affected with a public use of a national character and
are subject to national regulation. That it is a business within
the power of regulation by legislative action needs no discussion.
That has been settled since the case of Munn v. Illinois."' 8 6 The
statute assumed that stockyards were "affected with a public
interest" and so did the Chief Justice, without consideration of
the economic criteria. If it was "settled" in the Alunn case, he
did not state why. Apparently he was of the opinion that such
enterprises as stockyards had become public utilities in their own
right, which is more or less analogous to the reasoning in the
Brass case in reference to grain elevators.
During the period following the Munn and Budd cases there
was much judicial recognition given the functional approach.
The Associated Press was found to be "affected with a public
interest" by some courts8 7 while in another case it was emphatically held not to be.8 8 The monopoly element was held
more or less determinative in all of them. In Ladd v. Southern
Cotton Press Co.8 cotton gins were held to be private because
conditions made them "free to everyone" while in Tallahassee
Oil & Fertilizer Co. v. Holloway90 "the public interest" doe"See also Cotting v. Kansas City Co., 183 U. S. 79; D. L. & W. By.
CFo. v. Central Btockyard & Transit Co., 45 N. J. Eq. 50.
"*Infra, Note 95.

"Italics
ours.
"T Interocean Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438 (1900).
"State v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 419 (1901).
"53 Texas 172 (1880).
"200 Ala. 492 (1917).
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trine was applied largely on the basis of the monopoly situation
existing in the particular community. None of the cases seems
absolutely clear as to the philosophical method of approach employed, but all lean heavily upon economic criteria, which evidences the functional approach.
However, in 1914 the Supreme Court decided what may be
aptly called a landmark case when it disposed of the problem
raised in German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis.91 It had
before it a state regulation of the rates of fire insurance companies, which, of course, involved the question as to whether that
great business could be brought within the purview of the "public interest" doctrine. The Court was now face to face with
what might be called a question "of pure economic fact," for
the business of insurance was a far cry from the "facilities of
transportation."
The physical analogy to the carrier or its
allied groups was not even in the background. The Court was
compelled to consider the business purely from the standpoint
of its social and economic relation to the community. Justice
McKenna, writing for the majority, found himself more or less
"on his own," for even the Munn case was no direct authority
for the problem he had before him, except in so far as it gave
him a guide as to the functional method of attack. Actual
monopoly in the insurance business was not proved. What the
Court really decided was no more or no less than that the business was so vast and of such great importance to society as to
justify the application of the "public interest" doctrine. It must
be remembered that it was in this case that Justice Lamar so
strenuously rebelled, holding that physical analogy to the carrier was the only true basis for such an application. 92 Even
Justice McKenna had some difficulty with this matter, and he
began by saying, "We can best illustrate by examples. The
transportation of property-business of common carriers-is
obviously of public concern and its regulation is an accepted
governmental power. The transmission of intelligence is of
cognate character." This would seem to indicate that if the
business of insurance had had in it any elements of the business
of transportation, which was so "obviously" of a "public
" 233 U. S. 389 (1914).
9See supra, p. 29 herein.
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nature," Mr. Justice McKenna himself would have resorted to
physical analogy. But the absence of any such analogy-in
fact any analogy whatsoever to any business which had previously been placed in the "public" category-forced him into
the functional approach, which he so thoroughly adopted.
With this ultimate fruition of what Chief Justice Waite
called a principle of "social science" in the Munn case, the
Supreme Court seemed to have definitely set out to judge the
"publicness" of business on its economic and social utility alone.
The next important case to come up was the now famous
Block v. Hirsh,9" in which the Court was called upon to consider
the validity of a New York statute amounting to a declaration
that the business of housing was " affected with a public interest."
In a five to four decision the act was upheld. It had admittedly
been passed as an emergency measure to remedy post-war conditions in New York City. Mr. Justice Holmes wrote the
majority opinion and, as might well be expected, he adopted the
functional approach. After reviewing conditions in New York
which made it apparent that the large tenant class was severely
handicapped in dealing with the monopolistic landlords, he said:
"Housing is a necessary of life. All the elements justifying
some degree of public control are present. The only matter that
seems to us open to debate is whether the statute goes too far."
He concluded with little more argument that it did not.
Strange to say, we find that in this case Justice McKenna
was in the dissent. He had evidently become afraid of the
standards which he had set up, and was recoiling from the functional criteria. It is hard to see how the business of insurance
can be included within the "public interest" concept, and the
business of housing in New York City excluded, if such criteria
are to be determinative. But he was evidently afraid of a letting down of the bars, and of the subsequent swamping of economic individualism by public regulation. To use his own language. ". . . Houses are a necessary of life but other things
are as necessary." But the same reasoning could just as well
have been adopted in the German Alliance Co. case.
It is interesting in this particular to note the dissent of
Justice Field in the Munn case in which he observed that "The
" (1921) 256 U. S. 135.
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public has no greater interest in the use of buildings for the
storage of grain than it has in the use of buildings for the residences of families, nor, indeed, anything like so great an interest." The majoritkr of the Court in the Block case seemed
to be of a similar opinion.
It has been said 94 that, dating time from the decision of the
Munn case up to and including the year 1920, when Block v.
Hirsh was decided, the policy of the Supreme Court in applying
the "public interest" doctrine to business was one of "inclusion
rather than exclusion." This seems to be true, 91 for after the
year 1920 we find a rather definite reversal in form. The cases
also seem to show a reversal of the logical mode of attack, and a
reversion to the use again of the physical analogy as a substitute for the functional approach, which had evidently begun to
frighten the Court.
The first intimation which we have of the Court's change
of attitude came in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations.96 The case involved the validity of the action of the
Kansas Industrial Court in prescribing a wage scale in the business of a company engaged in the preparation of meat for the
market. The statute creating the Court had in effect declared
that the great industries affecting food, clothing, fuel, and transportation were impressed with a public interest. It was really
what one writer 97 calls an attempt to make the term "public
utilities" a synonym for necessaries of life.98
Chief Justice Taft, who spoke for the Court, rather ambitiously tried to summarize the philosophy of public regulation
under the "public interest" doctrine. It is a good example of
the utter confusion of the law in this respect. We can do no
better than to quote him: "Business said to be clothed with a
public interest justifying some public regulation may be divided
into three classes:
"' Haughan, Vicissitudes of the Price Fixing Doctrine, 2 Dakota L.
Rev. 430 (1929).
"Munn v. Rllinois, Budd v. New York, Brass v. North Dakota, the
German. Alliance case, and Block v. Hirsh, all uphold the doctrine.
,6 (1923) 262 U. S. 522, 67 L. Ed. 756.
O'Robinson, The Public Utility Concept, supra, Note 13.
" See also Humble, The Court of Industrial Relations In Kansas,
19 Mich. L. Rev. 675 (1921); Young, Industrial Courts, 5 Minn. L. Rev.
185; Rabinowitz, Kansas Industrial Court Act, 12 Calif. L. Rev. 1
(1923).
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"1. Those which are carried on under the authority of a
public grant of privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the affirmative duty of rendering public service demanded
by any member of the public. Such are the railroads, other common carriers, and public utilities.
"2.
Certain occupations regarded as exceptional, the
public interest attaching to which, recognized from the earliest
times, has survive& the period of arbitrary parliamentary or
colonial legislation for regulating all trades and callings. Such
are those of the keepers of inns, cabs, and gristmills. . .
"3.
Businesses which, though not public at their inception, may be fairly said to have risen to be such and have become
subject in consequence to some governmental regulation. They
have come to hold such a peculiar relation to the public that this
is superimposed upon them. In the language of the cases, the
owner by devoting his business to the public use, in effect grants
the public an interest in that use and subjects himself to public
regulation to the extent of that interest, although the property
continues to belong to its private owner and be entitled to protection accordingly." As supporting this proposition the Chief
Justice cites the Munn, Budd, and Brass cases, and the German
Alliance Co. case.
Space does not permit a detailed analysis of this classification. That it is superficial is apparent-in fact, it is meaningless. It has been pointed out the railroads and other common
carriers are in the "public" class largely as a result of the carryover of medieval concepts by physical analogy. But the Court
gives the public grant of privileges as determinative, and classes
them with what it calls "public utilities." Just what it means
by this latter is not apparent. In the second class why should
the inns, cabs, and gristmills be classed as exceptional? This
is simply begging the question, for why should they be so regarded? The real reason why they remained "public" has been
the enslavement of the courts to the physical analogy line of attack. In the third class the group of cases gathered to support
the general rule are those in which the public interest doctrine
has been applied functionally, with one exception. But the
Chief Justice relies on such a phrase as "devoting the business
to the public use and granting the public an interest in that
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use," whatever that means. It certainly does not mean holding
out to serve the public generally, which is its only common
sense meaning.
After laying down such general rules, he finally disposes
of the case by saying that if the business of preparing food could
be admitted to*be "affected with a public interest" the regulation attempted by the Kansas Court would not even then be
valid. However, by strong dictum he indicates that the Court
would never consent to placing such a business in the "public"
category. It would seem that he bases this deduction from the
fact that the business of preparing food does not resemble any
of the businesses previously placed within the purview of the
"public interest" doctrine.
Starting with the Wolff Packing Co. case the Supreme
Court seems to have definitely set its face against enlargement of
classification of businesses up6n economic
the "public"
and social considerations. Whether this is illustrative of a
deeper and more fundamental philosophical change of front, as
opposed to a mere' change in logical methods is another question.
It has been pointed out 99 that in the six years since 1920 the
Supreme Court has declared social and economic legislation unconstitutional in 'more cases than in the entire previous fifty-two
years. It is significant, however, to note that the "public interest" cases during the latter period show that the Court has
abandoned social and economic criteria, and resorted once again
to physical analogy.
After the Wolff Packing Co. case the Court, in 1927, was
called upon to decide whether it would accept the declaration
of the New York legislature that the business of reselling
theater tickets was affected with a public interest justifying the
fixing of prices at which such resales could be made. 100 By another five to four decision it was held that such a business, that
of "ticketbrokers" as the Court called it, was "private" and.
although subject to the licensing power of the state, could not
be regulated as to price. The majority opinion was written by
Justice Sutherland, who appears to have taken the "public
interest" doctrine under his wing. The reasoning which he emw Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme

Court, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 943, 944 (1927).
2* Tyson v. .Banton, (1927) 273 U. S. 418, 71 L. Ed. 718.
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ployed was heavily historical and in it can be rather clearly discerned the use of physical analogy. He starts out by saying
that a business is not "affected with a public interest" merely
because it is large, or because the public derives benefit from it.
The ritual of Justice Taft to the effect that the business must
be "devoted" to the public and its use granted is quoted and
approved, but no clarification of it is offered. Justice Sutherland
evidently disapproved of the functional approach in the German
Alliance case, for he says that it "marks the extreme limit to
which this court has gone in sustaining price-fixing legislation."
The Block case he disposes of as having been sustained in an
emergency. He concludes with the following. "A theater or
other place of entertainment does not meet this conception of
Lord Hale's aphorism (the one quoted by Chief Justice Waite
in the Mlunn case) or fall within the reasons of decisions of this
Court based upon them. A theater is a private enterprise which,
in its relation to the public differs obviously and widely, both in
character and degree, from a grain elevator, standing at the
gateway of commerce and taking toll . .
; or stockyards,
standing in like relation to the commerce and livestock; or an insurance company, engaged in a sort of common agency
Sales of theater tickets bear no relation to the commerce of the
country . . . and certainly a place of entertainment is in
no sense a public utility." A better example of reasoning by
physical analogy can hardly be found, unless it is in one of his
later opinions. Theaters are not like grain elevators, railroads,
and insurance companies-therefore it follows, ipso facto, that
they are not "affected with a public interest." If the reasoning
of Justice Sutherland be accepted at its face value it is difficult
to see how it will ever be possible to enlarge the list of "public"
businesses outside of an amendment to the Constitution.
Justices Holmes and Stone rendered vigorous dissent. The
former called the doctrine of "business affected with a public
interest" a "fiction intended to beautify what is disagreeable to
the sufferers." He says that "The truth seems to me to be
that, subject to compensation where compensation is due, the
legislature may forbid or restrict any businesses when it has
sufficient force of public opinion behind it."
Justice Stone's dissent is a splendid example of the func-
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tional approach. The view is taken that the prime justification
for price regulation is the existence of a situation where a considerable portion of the public are at the mercy of a business or
class of businesses, i. e. the existence of a monopoly, legal or
virtual. After a review of the theater business in New York
city, he concludes that such a situation there exists, and that
the regulation should be upheld. The facts which Justice Stone
referred to were not even given passing mention by Justice
Sutherland.
The following year came the case of Rihnik v. McBtide,1° 1
in which Justice Sutherland again spoke for the Court. The
subject was the regulation by New Jersey of maximum rates
chargeable by employment agencies. The statute was emphatically declared invalid, this time by a majority of six to three. The
logical approach is similar to that in the Tyson case, except for
the even more pronounced reliance upon physical analogy.
Justice Sutherland starts out by asking the question "Has the
business in question been devoted to the public use and an interest in effect been granted in that use?" With this meaningless phrase as a beginning, he cites Tyson v. Banton'02 for the
authority that size, or the fact that the public derives a benefit
from it, does not mean that business is 'affected with a public
interest." His final reasoning should be quoted. "The business
of securing employment for those seeking work and employees
for those seeking workers is essentially that of a broker, an intermediary. While we do not say that there may be a deeper
concern on the part of the public in the business of an employment agency, that business does not differ in substantial character from the business of real estate broker, ship broker, merchandise broker, or ticket broker." He then cites the Tyson
case for the authority that the business of ticket brokers is not
"affected with a public interest," and says: "It is not easy to
see how, without disregarding that decision, price fixing legislation in respect of other brokers of like character, can be upheld." He concludes by stating categorically that the business
of an employment agency is a private one, like that of a druggist,
butcher, baker, etc.
(1928) 277 U. S. 250, 72 L. Ed. 913, 56 A. L. R. 1440.
Supra, Note 99.
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In one of the most scholarly opinions on the subject, Justice
Stone again dissented. He reiterated that the chief justfication
for regulation was the existence of a monopoly. The idea that
the decision in the Tyson case governed the case before the Court
was discredited, since the businesses were not at all similar, even
though they might both be brokerage concerns. A large part of
the opinion is taken up with an exhaustive survey of conditions
existing in and because of employment agencies, and there can
be little doubt, after a perusal of the data, that the need for
regulation is in the nature of a necessity. The recognized evil
practices in the business, and the social and economic effects are
clearly set forth. We can certainly agree with him when he says
"that there is a marked difference between the character of this
business and that of real estate brokers, ship brokers, merchandise brokers, and more than all, ticket brokers." The fact that
the cogent reasoning of Justice Stone did not prevail may be
taken as meaning that the majority of the Supreme Court have
turned their backs upon the functional approach, and have committed themselves to the outworn method of physical analogy.
So it is not surprising that we find the Court frowning upon
the efforts of Tennessee to regulate the price of gasoline. No
similar business had ever been declared to be "affected with
a public interest," and the business bears no direct relation to
the commerce of the country. Since Justice Sutherland denied
the existence of a monopoly in the case, we have no definite way
of knowing what the decision would have been if it had been
shown. However, judging from the Court's remarks it would
seem that they regard the gasoline business as inherently

"private."103

IV.
It is difficult to attempt any very precise summary of the
operation of the two conflicting judicial methods of thought as
have been set forth here. Judicial philosophy at its best is not
very well defined or worked out, and here we have it at its
worst. However, the study does seem to show that the following
conclusions are warranted:
(1)
That the origin of our doctrine of business "affected

10 Supra, page

16 herein.
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with a public interest" is found in the medieval English law of
common callings, and has been projected into our modern jurisprudence by means of physical analogy to the two such "common" groups which survived-the carrier and the innkeeper.
(2) Beginning with Munn v. Iflinoislo4 we find the courts in
this country breaking away from the application of the doctrine
through physical analogy to these two groups, and adopting the
method of reasoning which we have called functional, or what
Professor Robinson has called the criterion of economic fact.10 5
This breaking away was had with difficulty and we still find
traces of the carrier analogy. However, beginning with the
German Alliance Co. case we have the Supreme Court relying
entirely upon functional considerations, an attitude which
apparently lasted until the decision in the Wolff Packing Co.
case.
(3) From the time of the Wolff Packing Co. case to the
present day the Supreme Court has apparently abandoned this
method, and the Tyson, McBride, and Williams cases seem to
show a reversion to the use of physical analogy, which now is
relied on to restrict the "public interest" doctrine.
If the habits of thought of Justice Sutherland prevail, and
there is no basis for the conclusion that they will not, 10 6 it
would seem that the "public interest" doctrine will be frozen
where it now stands, and will no longer be used as a medium
for extending public regulation, 6xcept in the case of businesses
already classified as "public."
WmmTA_ C. SCOTT
Attorney at Law.
New York City.
%"94 U. S. 113.
" The Public Utility as Social Engineering, supra, Note 26.
1CEven Justice Stone concurred in the last decision, Williamg v.
Standard Oil Co., supra, Note 1, presumably out of deference to the
decision of the majority in Ribnik v. McBride.

